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Reports of humanitarian crises and appeals for help appear almost daily in the media. 
Humanitarianism refers to the impartial, independent and neutral provision of relief to 
those in immediate danger of harm (Barnett, 2005:724). More broadly, humanitarianism 
refers to the extension of kindness, benevolence, and sympathy to all human beings.   
  
As a concept, humanitarianism has evolved historically, but universality has remained a 
common theme. It involves no distinction on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation, 
race, caste, age, religion, ability, or nationality. In this sense, any human being in need 
is deserving of help. These universal principles are promoted daily through humanitarian 
communications and appeals, combined with the implied moral imperative to respond and 
to act. At the same time, concern has been expressed about an emerging ‘privatism’ in 
current utilitarian forms of humanitarianism which, underpinned by neoliberal1 principles, 
conceives of solidarity as ‘free choice’ (Chouliaraki, 2013).   
  
It appears that the humanitarian field is politically, historically and morally fraught 
(Barnett, 2005; Calhoun, 2010), and public responses to humanitarian crises seem 
complex and inconsistent. For example, there is a puzzling unevenness in public donations 
                                        
1 Neoliberalism has been defined broadly as generalization of the market logic beyond the sphere of 
commercial exchange (Chourialaki, 2013:180), through which the moral primacy of ‘public good’ is 
replaced by prioritization of the individual and his/her gratification.  
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to humanitarian crises (Zagefka et al., 2011), and a lack of consistency in relation to the 
gravity of the damage and the cost to human life. The UK Disasters Emergency Committee 
(DEC) received a total of £200 million in response to its appeal for the tsunami in South 
East Asia, which contrasts starkly with the £13.6 million received for the Darfur Crisis 
since 24 May, 2007. The 2004 tsunami killed 200,000 people and left 600,000 homeless; 
the conflict in Darfur left 1.5 million people reliant on humanitarian aid (Zagefka and 
James, 2015:168). Zagefka et al. (2011) attribute this to different reactions following 
natural versus humanly-caused events. However, this does not account for the difference 
in responses to natural disasters in different parts of the world. For example, US citizens 
donated 25% less to victims of the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia than to those affected 
by hurricane Katrina, which killed about 1,600 people. According to Singer (2009), this 
reaction is based on parochialism: we are more likely to respond emotionally and give to 
those that are closer or similar to us.   
  
In the UK, the revenue derived from private donors is relatively stable, but fewer people 
now commit to humanitarian assistance through a direct debit than in the past (Darnton 
and Kirk, 2011). In addition, the relationship between non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and their publics appears to be in crisis (Author et al., 2014). There is considerable 
evidence also that private donors tend to respond more generously to rapid onset natural 
disasters than to chronic and conflict-related crises (Author et al., 2014; Stirk, 2015b; 
Zagefka, 2011). Many major recipients of humanitarian assistance are characterized as 
being in complex crises, and in countries suffering conflict with very limited capacity to 




The limited research on public responses to humanitarian crises provides inconclusive and 
contradictory findings. In the context of a growing humanitarian financing gap (Stirk, 
2015b), in which the number, scale and severity of humanitarian crises are outstripping 
resources (Stirk, 2015a), more information on and the ability to make more sense of 
public responses to humanitarian crises are becoming increasingly urgent. Despite more 
than 40 years of research on prosocial behaviour (see Dovidio et al., 2006 for a review), 
only a small number of psychology researchers have studied prosocial behaviour in 
response to humanitarian crisis.   
  
A review of the existing research identifies three sets of characteristics which influence 
people’s willingness to help: the victim's blamelessness, the victim's proactivity, and the 
similarity between victim and helper. There is ample evidence that the perceived 
innocence of the victim is important for determining prosocial behaviour and that it is 
easier to persuade the public to help ‘innocent’ victims compared to those who can be 
blamed for their misfortune (e.g. Betancourt, 1990; Campbell et al., 2001; Jackson & 
Esses, 1997; Piliavin et al., 1969; Stroebe and Stroebe, 1996; Weiner, 1993). The theory 
of ‘belief in a just world’ (Hafer and Begue, 2005; Lerner, 1980; Lerner and Simmons, 
1966) suggests that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get, and that 
such belief is actively promoted by devaluing or attributing culpability to victims (e.g. 
Anderson, 1992; Connors and Heaven, 1990; Kristiansen and Giuletti, 1990; Lerner, 1997; 
Montada, 1998) and adopting a psychological distance from the victim (Hafer, 2000; Hafer 
and Begue, 2005; Hafer et al., 2005).   
When there is a perception of similarity and an identifiable victim can be transformed into 
a cause, donors are more generous and more compassionate (Bartels and Burnett, 2011; 
Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Slovic, 2007; Small et al., 2007). Identifiable victims are considered 
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more familiar (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997) and the perception of similarity to the victim 
has been shown to influence caring behaviour (Wayment, 2004). Indeed, there is 
evidence that intergroup bias and group and national membership influence behaviour 
(van Leeuwen & Tauber, 2011), and that a bystander is more likely to offer help in an 
emergency situation if the victim is perceived to belong to the same social stratum as the 
perceiver (Levine et al., 2005; Levine and Thompson, 2004; Reicher et al., 2006).   
There is evidence also that people are more inclined to help those who are proactive in 
helping themselves following a disaster (Zagefka et al., 2011), apathy from the victim 
feeds victim blame, and the perception that the victims making positive efforts to improve 
their situation increases the willingness to help (Stroebe and Stroebe, 1996).   
  
The findings from these studies are contradictory, inconsistent and insufficient to address 
the complexities of humanitarian helping. For example, Zagefka and Brown (2008) find a 
common bias towards victims of humanly-caused disasters, who are perceived as less 
proactive in helping themselves and, also, implicated in their own suffering, which 
reinforces the 'just world' hypothesis. However, Sun et al. (2013) and Zagefka et al. 
(2011) find that although perceiving the victim as blameless increases the concern of 
helpers, their perceived competence reduces the drive to help.  
  
Overall, although little is known about why people are more inclined to help some victims 
of humanitarian crises than others, extant research points to a complex relation between 
being deserving of help and prosocial behaviour. There is an urgent need for further 
research (Zgefka and James, 2015), in particular, on how the characteristics of the needy 
influence helping behaviour. The literature suggests, but does not pursue in depth, that 
people’s perceptions and responses are mediated by their belief systems and ideas of 
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fairness, and influenced by socio-historical and ideological constructs of who and how 
deserving are the victims. Cross-cultural studies have recognized that history and cultural 
stereotypes affect decisions about helping victims of humanitarian crises (Andringhetto 
et al., 2014; Bain et al., 2009, 2014; Sun et al., 2014), but psychological research is 
scarce and fragmented and leaves many questions unanswered. With a few notable 
exceptions (Reicher et al., 2006; Stevenson and Manning, 2010), the existing research is 
mostly quantitative, laboratory-based and inductive. Specifically, we need to know more 
about how the factors influencing prosocial behaviour fit within people’s broader 
understanding of humanitarianism, their responses and reactions to humanitarian 
information, and the cultural, political and ideological resources informing these reactions. 
Capturing these dimensions in a study of prosocial behaviour requires a discursive 
approach.  
  
This paper contributes to prosocial research by addressing these issues. The discursive 
analysis discusses in detail the principles through which focus group participants debated 





Analytic approach  
Our enquiry focuses on the social preconditions for moral reasoning and decisionmaking, 
revealed in commonsense or ideology. That is, it investigates the aspects of socially 
shared beliefs that give rise to individuals' dilemmatic and inherently contradictory 
thinking (Billig et al., 1988). The conceptual framework of ideological dilemmas provides 
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an in depth understanding of the complex and contradictory commonsense principles 
currently applied in Britain, and their multiple, often colliding, ideologies. It allows 
examination of how the universalist principles underpinning humanitarianism, intersect 
and clash with neoliberal and other contrasting commonsense notions of morality and 
fairness. It focuses on how “the processes of cultural and ideological histories flow 
through the minds of the subjects” (Billig et al., 1988:2) to capture how ideology is 
mapped onto individual consciousness (Ibid: 6-7).   
Within this framework, ideologies are understood as multi-layered, complex, unstable  
,situated within and influenced by, historically relevant contexts with which they interact 
in complex and contradictory ways (Towns and Adams, 2009:737). Dilemmas, which are 
deeply imbedded in culture and expressed through language, occur through 
commonsense notions of value, community and suitable ways of behaving that are socially 
and culturally imbedded and that are often conflicting and contradictory (Towns  
& Adams, 2008:738).   
  
The commonsense quality of lived ideology is captured in analyses of ‘interpretative 
repertoires’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1988, 1992), the building blocks speakers use to 
construct factual versions of reality, make evaluations and perform particular actions. 
They are also social resources used by the speaker to justify particular versions of events 
(Edley, 2001), to excuse or to validate his/her own behaviour, to fend off criticism or 
otherwise allow maintenance of a credible stance in an interaction (Wetherell and Potter, 
1992). Since interpretative repertoires are part of any community’s sense of 
understanding, they convey a sense of familiarity and everyday recognition. Hence, they 
appear obvious, and what ‘everybody knows’, rather than an individual, personal opinion 




The discursive analysis looks also at how speakers take up certain positions in relation to 
others in order for their actions to be understood and make sense as social acts (Tan and 
Moghaddam, 1995). Positioning is always relational and takes place in the context of the 
social realm (Harre’ and Moghaddam, 2003) within which what we say and do is shaped 
/ restricted / enabled by the rights and duties we are assigned according to our particular 
social context of interaction. In line with this, in the present analysis, discourse is 
understood as situated within both local and broader socio-cultural contexts. Locally, data 
are situated within a research project exploring public responses to humanitarian 
communications and, within that context, individual extracts are situated in the sequential 
environment (Potter and Hepburn, 2008) of a focus group discussion. Data also are 
situated more broadly through participants' positioning in relation to socio-cultural norms 
of prosocial behaviour and social responsibility, and normative demands from what has 
been described as the ‘humanitarian imaginary’ (Calhoun, 2010). Within this micro/macro 
socio-cultural landscape, participants engage dialogically in ideological dilemmas, assume 
more or less stable positions, and use hierarchical categorizations to argue who is 
deserving of more or less help, and to justify their own practices in the humanitarian 
context, thereby illustrating how discourse and practice are intertwined.  
  
The Study   
The extracts discussed below come from the first phase of data collection within a three-
year interdisciplinary research project on public responses to humanitarian 
communication.2 This nationwide study sought to examine, amongst other things, how 
                                        
2 For further information on the project phases see: Author xxx. The project received ethical approval 
from xxxx  
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the UK public relates to distant suffering, and how it understands and reacts to 
humanitarian communication. The key research questions for the first phase of the project 
were: What are the moral responses and reactions evoked in audiences by humanitarian 
communications? What sociocultural scripts do people use to make sense of humanitarian 
communications? And what are the ideological, emotional and biographical underpinnings 
of these responses?   
The data discussed here come from 20 focus groups involving members of the UK public 
(n=182). Participants were recruited by an independent market research company and 
were invited to take part in a discussion on “Small world: attitudes towards and 
perceptions of what goes on around us in the world”. Groups were selected to be 
representative of ages, genders, socio-economic classes, sexual orientations and family 
formations. Each of the focus group participants was given a folder containing a selection 
of communications from 11 collaborating NGOs;3 they were asked to focus on their 
thoughts and feelings in response to the communications. They were asked to share 
responses with the group and were encouraged to develop the discussion as if in a natural 
setting. The interviewers (the author and a research assistant) asked questions, only 
when necessary and opportune to maintain the flow of interactions, on previous exposure 
to similar communications and consequent actions; how they perceived the content of 
the message; their thoughts and emotions in reaction to the appeals; their sense of 
personal responsibility and ability to help; and the motivations for responding proactively.   
  
Data were analysed thematically and discursively. Thematic analysis was used to map  
                                        
3 ActionAid, Amnesty International, Disasters and Emergency Committee (DEC), Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF), Oxfam, PLAN UK, Save the Children, UNICEF. The communications were ramdomly 
ordered in the packs to avoid bias.   
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the themes that emerged from the focus groups. Discursive analysis was applied to create 
typologies of the discursive, ideologically laden repertoires and moral scripts informing 
audiences’ moral responses.  
The issue of deservingness discussed in this paper emerged unprompted in the focus 
group discussions and featured as a regular component of participants’ moral reasoning 
about humanitarian helping, which was pervasively dilemmatic. The extracts discussed 
here were selected on the basis of their salience and exemplification of the dilemmatic 
discussion around deservingness.  
  
Analysis and Discussion  
What follows is a discussion of three repertoires constructing the position of deserving on 
the basis of different principles.   
1. ‘Seeing a difference’ is a repertoire of effectiveness and self-efficacy, which 
positions beneficiaries as deserving because of evidence that they made good use 
of previous help.   
2. ‘Waiting in queues’ is a repertoire of respect which constructs deservingness on 
the basis of cultural similarities between beneficiary and benefactor.  
3. ‘Something for nothing’ is a neoliberal repertoire constructed around the principle 
that receiving something should be conditional on the beneficiary having earned 
it, having worked for it.  
  
In identifying and analysing these repertoires particular attention is paid to the images 
evoked and the metaphors used by participants. These are used to instantiate ‘the way 
one talks on this sort of occasion’ (Davies and Harre’, 2001:265) which, with or without 
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the speaker’s awareness, both assumes and invokes particular ways of being and of moral 
commitment.   
  
The discursive analysis illustrates the dilemmatic nature of the participants’ everyday 
moral reasoning; that decisions pertaining to humanitarian helping overwhelmingly were 
conditional on the contingent characteristics of the beneficiaries and their behaviour, and 
were negotiated on the basis of ideological and socio-cultural principles of fairness, which 
otherwise are not explicitly or intrinsically connected to humanitarianism. Thus, these 
repertoires were argumentatively in opposition to the universalism proposed by NGO 
communications and by a minority of participants who believed that help should be given 
“wherever it is needed’”4   
  
  
‘Seeing a difference being made’   
Otto's comments are illustrative of this repertoire and were made in a focus group held 
in Wales with ABC1 men aged between 56 and 65 years.5 Otto’s comments followed a 
suggestion from Orlando that probably people donated to the Japanese tsunami because 
the technology allowed us to see the devastation as it happened; if they had had more 
time to consider they may not have donated as much. Orlando concluded  
that:6 “(…) sort of the immediate gut reaction to something you see live on TV. You 
can sense the tragedy”  
  
                                        
4 For reasons of brevity, this universalist repertoire is not discussed in detail here.  
5 Focus group participants were given pseudonyms whose initial letter indicated the sequencing of the groups, e.g. 
names in group 1 started with A, in group 2 with B, and so on.  
6 See transcription conventions.   
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Otto But initially they [the Japanese] refused help whereas in Africa there’s been the 
bowl where you just can’t fill it. This is the sad fact of the reality I think. Africa 
has had billions of pounds and they’re still nowhere near, and yet in Japan, 
they’re going forward. They’re even building, you know, and you think (.) I don’t 
know. I don’t know the answer to be honest but, you know, what is it? There is 
something… People, a lot are willing to do that and others, as you said about 
India, Q<no, we do it ourselves>Q.  
Interviewer Do you think you’d be more likely to give to a cause where you feel as 
though it wasn’t in the category of the endless bowl but it was...?  
Otto Yes.  
  
This repertoire constructs ‘deservingness’ on the basis of two principles. The first principle 
of deservingness contrasts those who ask repeatedly for help with those who refuse help. 
This binary appears in the opening sentence which compares the selfsufficient (they 
refused help) with the endlessly needy (the bowl where you just can’t fill it). The stake 
inoculation that follows (this is the sad fact of the reality), presents the difference 
between Japan and Africa as a fact, not as Otto’s opinion. The inoculation is strengthened 
by the qualifier ‘sad’, which implies that however much he/we might wish things were 
different, this is how they are, warranting Otto’s neutrality and ability to present a 
balanced view of the situation.   
  
The phrase “Africa’s bowl where you just can’t fill it” provides further support for this 
and represents the second principle of deservingness, which is based on proactivity and 
proof of effectiveness. In this context the deserving status is allocated to those who are 
dynamic in their response and progress through the help received. These individuals are 
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contrasted with those who are stuck and on whom help is wasted, articulated through 
the metaphor of a journey or trajectory. The undeserving group is defined as those who 
are “still nowhere near”, although near to what is unclear; the idea of a journey or 
progress towards a target is implied. It is this unspecified, but commonly assumed target 
that the undeserving nations are still nowhere near reaching, which suggests persistent 
behaviours.   
The repeated use − and in quick succession − of “you know, and you think (.) I don’t 
know. I don’t know the answer to be honest, but”, which immediately follow, indicate 
hesitation, dilemma and potential conflict. The pause is particularly significant. Otto is 
building up to a causal explanation of why Japan is going forward and even building; he 
attempts to manufacture consent by using you know, implying that he is voicing what 
any ordinary person would think; then he stops, as if to suggest that what might be 
thought cannot be said. This is followed by repetition of I don’t know, disavowing what 
he is about to say, and then a classic disclaimer, I don’t know the answer to be honest, 
but… The added qualifier to be honest seems to be a pre-emptive move in the face of 
potential accusation. This applies also to the rhetorical “what is it? [t]here is something”, 
followed immediately by active voicing of “No, we do it ourselves”, which suggests even 
more strongly that Otto is working very hard to establish the factuality of his account.   
  
This begs the question of what it is that Otto is so keen to avoid being seen as doing. It 
would seem that Otto has returned to the first binary, now spelled out even more clearly 
as a differentiation between those who refuse help and are self-sufficient, and “a lot 
(who) are willing to do that”. Again, what “a lot are willing to do” is not defined, but 
the reference to willingness is crucial.  Whilst initially Africa was referred to as an 
inanimate object (a begging bowl), it is now attributed agency, and the powerful 
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metaphor of “the bowl that you just can’t fill” acquires a more layered meaning. The 
initial formulation seemed to suggest endless need, but in the context of the attribution 
of agency it reads more as endless taking. So, here, deservingness is constructed as both 
doing something with the help received, and also as not taking it at all.   
  
This deserving group includes those who “are going forward” , are moving on and are 
dynamic, while the undeserving group is constructed implicitly as stuck and static. The 
Japanese are admired in this categorization because they are ‘even building’, thus, further 
supporting the claim that deserving victims are energetic and proactive in dealing with 
disaster situations.   
  
Otto’s account displays an intriguing and paradoxical logic according to which Japan is 
deserving precisely because it refused help, but Otto’s position is neither unusual nor 
idiosyncratic. According to the DEC, the UK public insisted on donating to Japan despite 
Japan’s stated refusal to accept aid. However, the hesitations, disclaimers and false starts 
might point also to stake inoculation to avoid potential accusation that Otto’s views of 
Africa are prejudicial and stereotypical. This is discussed in more detail in the Conclusion.   
  
  
’Waiting in queues for water’   
This repertoire is exemplified by Raina7’s account which was part of a discussion about 
the need to see the effectiveness of help and self-help, but it introduces a different 
principle of deservingness based on cultural assimilation demonstrated by the beneficiary 
                                        
7 Group R took place in Glasgow with C1C2 women aged 26-35 years.  
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adhering to the giver’s norms of conduct. The Japanese are again positioned as deserving, 
this time because they are stoic and civilized in the face of disaster.   
  
Raina I take my hat off to the Japanese people. I just think what a humble (.) I mean, 
how they’ve managed to do that? because I have watched that, where you’ve 
seen (.), you know, you’re watching, like, the Haiti thing, and obviously Katrina 
as well, and that is in America, where you would think such a rich, rich country 
would be able to do it, and I mean, it’s amazing what the Japanese have done 
to  
it, and how, even after it, days after, they were queuing properly , they were 
(.), you know, and for me, you know, if anything again God forbid were to 
happen, I would be more than willing to give them whatever they [need], you 
know, money.  
Interviewer  So you (.), because you sense that they respond more effectively, or 
efficiently to the crisis, and so, you would want to give more, as opposed to 
other places where you feel as though they’re unlike (.) they don’t use the 
money ‘as well’ [Interviewer mimes quotation marks]  
Raina To me, it just came across as, oh, their culture, and everything about them, I 
just really found them to be (.) I don’t even think you would get that in this 
country, you know, the waiting in queues for water, helping people getting out, 
you know, yes, if anything happened, then you would think, yes [I would give], 
because you know your money’s going to help them.  
  
This is a repertoire of respect, captured by the idiom ”I take my hat off to”. The first part 
of the extract from Raina continues the comparison between Japan, Haiti and the UK, 
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introduced by Reba. Raina starts with a rhetorical question “how have they managed to 
do that?’” In answering this she manages her accountability by positioning herself as a 
witness (Wooffitt, 1992). She says “because I have watched that” and later she repeats 
“you’re watching”. This grants her view authority, authenticity and objectivity: what she 
is referring to is not a second-hand account or her personal interpretation, but something 
that anybody can see. She then compares the responses to the natural disasters in Japan, 
Haiti and America. Up to this point she seems to be elaborating on the principle of 
effectiveness and self-help, but what she defines as ‘amazing’ has nothing to do with 
building and effective response. Japanese are amazing because “days after [the tsunami] 
they were queuing properly”.   
  
Although acknowledging their proactivity and self-efficacy, in this repertoire the Japanese 
victims are deserving because they show humility and maintain polite behaviour in the 
face of chaos. The interviewer misinterprets this and mistakes her comment as referring 
to proof of effectiveness. Raina corrects her using the particle  
‘oh’, thus  establishing her epistemic authority over the interviewer (Potter and Hepburn, 
2008; Heritage and Raymond, 2005). It is in this second part of her intervention that 
Raina returns to queuing and spells out clearly the connection between Japanese cultural 
habits and British national identity.   
  
Considering that this was a British focus group the example given as deserving of 
admiration, approval and, ultimately, help – the capacity to queue properly following an 
earthquake – is rife with cultural significance. The British excel at and pride themselves 
on their queuing, and the capacity to queue is part of British identity. Not only do the 
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Japanese display cultural traits similar to British ones, according to Raina they are even 
better than the British.   
  
The existence of socio-cultural similarities between the UK and Japan has been 
commented on previously. Both are island nations situated at the edge of large continents 
and have overcome physical distance to play important roles in history, technological 
development and cultural influence. In this context, the socio-cultural similarities between 
Japan and Britain position both as civil societies that help themselves, refuse to beg and 
are proud of their self-sufficiency and self-efficacy. It is these characteristics that make 
Japan deserving and that would motivate Raina to make future donations and provide 
help.   
  
This is not a repertoire of need following devastation, which would apply to all those 
suffering from the effects of natural disasters – Japan, USA, Haiti, Africa. Rather, it is 
about cultural mirroring and identification. The overarching and effusive respect and 
admiration this generates is captured by the metaphorical colloquialism “I take my hat 
off to’”. Raina's concluding words “if anything again God forbid, were to happen, I 
would be more than willing to give them whatever they (needed)”, demonstrate 
empathy mediated through identification and cultural assimilation.   
   
’Something for nothing’   
This neoliberal repertoire bases deservingness on the principle that receiving something 
should be conditional on the beneficiary having earned it, and that the individual and 
his/her gratification should be prioritized over the moral primacy of ‘public good’ 
(Chouliaraki, 2013:180). In line with these neoliberal principles, the rhetorical work 
17  
  
performed by Nelson and Neville in the following extracts positions the self as the most 
deserving receiver.   
Nelson8:   I mean everyone always wants something more. Like, there’s always 
something you want so I mean I was thinking like before, to be honest, I was 
looking at eBay and some stuff I want and I was thinking I wish I could just 
have it’, like not have to think about [it] like footballers, for example, they can 
have literally anything they want and I mean it’s all well and good saying 
Q<donate £2 a month>Q but I’d rather save that little bit just so I can go and 
get something I want and even when I get that there’s something else I want.  
There’s always going to be something everyone wants.   
Interviewer:  Do you think we are greedy then?  Is that what you’re saying?  
Nelson:  No, I wouldn’t say we’re greedy. It’s just that everyone would (.) well people 
that want something have to work hard. I work hard so (.) and I want to have 
these luxuries but that’s why I work hard. If I didn’t want all these luxuries then 
I wouldn’t work hard, do you see what I mean? I think everyone’s different but 
it all boils down to money at the end of the day.  
  
The discussion then moved on to advertising, subliminal messages and brainwashing.  
The interviewer brought it back to humanitarianism by asking participants if they thought 
we ought to help others. It is in this context that Neville returned to the contrast between 
giving to charities and buying something for oneself.   
  
Neville:  If that’s what you’ve earned your money for, you’ve gone out and worked 
hard enough and that’s something that you’ve set your mind on, a goal, you’ve 
                                        
8 Nelson and Neville were part of a group of C1C2 males in Nottingham aged 18-25 years  
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given yourself a goal, I want to get an iPod, it costs £200 I will work and save 
my money to get what I desire. If you can do that then you should do it happily. 
It’s not someone else’s choice to say, Q< no, with that money that you’ve just 
raised you should go and give it to somebody else>Q. At the end of the day 
why is that person telling you this, do you know what I mean?  Whoever’s telling 
you to go and give £200 here, £200 there, it’s coming off TV. It’s coming off 
internet, everything.   
  
Both speakers’ accounts are openly self-centred, brimming with materialistic 
considerations, and in opposition to the altruistic stance advocated by NGOs. Nelson 
manages his accountability through stake inoculation. He starts and then returns to the 
statement “everyone always wants something more” which is presented as a selfevident 
fact. His characterization of humans as intrinsically and endlessly desiring subjects, 
warrants Nelson’s insatiable yearnings as normal and universal, and pre-empts potential 
criticism of his choice not to give £2 a month to charity so that he could buy more ‘stuff’. 
The action orientation of Nelson’s speech is identifiable in the shift from personal to 
general: “There’s something else I want” is followed by “there is always going to be 
something everyone wants’“ whereby his own personal stance is transformed into a 
factual statement about universal human nature. This shift is essential to enable Nelson 
to manage his own accountability. The principle underpinning this repertoire is spelled 
out by Nelson in his counter-argumentation with the interviewer: it is OK to want things 
but one has to work hard for them; that is, it is wrong to get something for nothing.   
  
Some of these features are present also in Neville’s intervention when he returns to the 
motif of being told that he should give his money to charity. However, Nelson reframes 
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consumerist desires in psychological terms as giving “yourself a goal”, and elaborates on 
the implicit moral condemnation expressed through active voicing. The ideological 
dilemma between universalist humanitarian and individualistic neoliberal principles is 
evidenced here in his defensiveness of his statement that “It’s not someone else’s choice 
to say ‘no, with that money that you’ve just raised you should go and give it to 
somebody else”’, which suggests that, like Nelson, the action orientation of Neville’s 
account is to counter the perceived condemnation of his behaviour from humanitarian 
and societal norms of altruism.   
  
In Neville’s contribution also, the deserving position is constructed through a neoliberal 
discourse, which values individual enterprise and personal gratification, mixed with the 
therapeutic regime of self-management, self-governance, ‘responsibilization’ and agency. 
Thus Neville’s account mixes principles of work ethics with psychological ideas of ‘self-
realization’, through which hard work, saving and buying an i-pod are construed as self-
enhancing ‘goal setting’. The morality imbued in this construction, driven by what Marcuse 
would call ‘repressive needs’, is key to the oppositional stance towards those who try to 
argue that he should donate his hard-earned £200 to charity. The liberal principle of the 




The analysis presented here corroborates and confirms that, in the context of 
humanitarian crises, evidence of the effectiveness of help received (Arumi et al., 2005; 
Bekkers and Wiepkin, 2011; Smith and McSweeney, 2007), perceived similarity with the 
victim, the victim's innocence (Cikara et al., 2011; Levine et al., 2005; Reicher et al., 
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2006), and the degree to which victims are perceived to be helping themselves, are 
determining factors in the decision to help or not (Zagefka et al., 2011).   
  
There was a consensus in the group that concrete evidence that aid had been used 
effectively and evidence of victims’ willingness to help themselves were crucial for 
achieving a positive response from the British public; this was illustrated in ‘seeing a 
difference’ and ‘waiting in queues’ repertoires. In this latter, the perceived similarity 
between British participants and Japanese victims determined deservingness and fostered 
a willingness to help in the public. These findings concur with extant research that the 
moral principle that one should help those who help themselves is important for deciding 
who is deserving of help (Zagefka et al., 2010). Also, we can see the influence of a belief 
in a just-world principle: it is morally right to help those who have not caused their own 
plight (such as victims of natural disasters) and those who try actively to help themselves 
(such as the Japanese). Self-inflicted helplessness is judged negatively and deters 
potential donors.   
  
However, the repertoires discussed display a complex and intricate mode of reasoning, 
which highlights that these factors are not fixed and static, do not operate in isolation 
and are used flexibly and rhetorically to discursively construct hierarchies of 
deservingness. With the exception of a few studies, which highlight the importance of the 
plasticity and flexibility of self-other categorization in prosocial dynamics (Levine et al., 
2002, 2005; Reicher et al., 2006; Stevenson and Manning, 2010), current research 
overlooks the flexible, dynamic and contradictory nature of people’s everyday moral 




Our findings contribute to the prosocial literature by addressing this lacuna. The data 
point to the multi-layered and complex nature of people’s moral responses to 
humanitarian information. They show also that these factors do not operate in isolation, 
but rather act as tools in a socially shared cultural ‘tool-kit’ (Burr, 2003), which allows the 
British public to reason morally about, and respond to, humanitarian issues. In the process 
of identifying and clarifying who is and who is not deserving of their help, the focus group 
participants illustrated the dilemmatic nature of these decisions and the crucial role of the 
socio-cultural landscape, which constitutes the context for these decisions. The plasticity 
and flexibility of the categories of deservingness was further illustrated by how 
participants challenged familiar geopolitical attributions. For example, deservingness in 
the repertoires did not always map onto the division between the developed global North 
and the developing global South. Indeed, in repertoire two the superpowers – Japan and 
the USA – are polar opposites.   
  
This complexity requires situated analyses, able to engage with the data in the local 
context of the focus groups as well as in the wider context of the ideological resources 
drawn on by participants. The multi-faceted and ideologically dilemmatic nature of the 
repertoires of deservingness call for discursive analyses that take account of the fluidity 
and flexibility of the repertoires and their action orientation. The analysis in this paper 
suggests that the dilemma around whether to give or not, which tends to dominate much 
of helping research (Sargeant, 1999) and humanitarian debates (Darnton and Kirk, 2010), 
is secondary to the establishment of hierarchies of deservingness, exemplified by the 
‘waiting in queues’ repertoire, where giving and helping are not questioned. Rather, as 
the analysis shows, in the local context of the focus groups, the rhetorical work centred 
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on establishing the reasonableness of the conditions under which some deserve to receive 
help (or material goods) and some do not.   
  
The role played by the categories of deservingness has important implications for 
humanitarianism since, in effect, it challenges and undermines the universalist principles 
of humanitarianism which, by definition, reject the conditionality of helping. These 
principles were spelt out in one of the communications from Médecins Sans Frontières, 
which was included in the participants' packs and which portrays medical personnel 
assisting a small child. The caption lists the possible nationalities of the child, followed by 
the word ‘Human’ and the caption ‘Donate without discrimination’, which testifies that 
humanitarian helping is unconditional and an intrinsic moral right for anyone in need. Put 
simply, all human beings are deserving of humanitarian help.   
  
In opposition to this, the common feature of the otherwise different repertoires, is that 
all argue that helping and receiving should be conditional on the receivers’ characteristics, 
and contingent on their behaviour and what they have done to earn that help.  
The moral principles invoked in this argument are used flexibly across different 
repertoires. For example, the repertoires ‘seeing a difference’ and ‘something for 
nothing’ differ in their content and in who is deemed deserving. Yet, in both cases, 
deservingness hinges on having to earn the help or the material goods.   
  
Similarly, Japan is presented as an exemplar of deservingness in two of the repertoires, 
but for different reasons: self-efficacy and self-sufficiency in repertoire 1 (seeing a 
difference), and by reason of cultural similarity in repertoire 2 (waiting in queues).  
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However, in both cases, what is argued or implied is that Japan is deserving because it is 
like Britain - culturally, behaviourally and morally. In short, Japan is part of the 'ingroup' 
and its otherness is eliminated.   
  
In this sense, Japan is contrasted starkly with the quintessentially Other, Africa, which, in 
the first repertoire, is positioned as undeserving. Humanitarian and International 
Development NGOs are well acquainted with this persistent negative perception among 
the British public of Africa as a ’bottomless pit’, whose problems are considered internal, 
self-generated and intractable (Darnton and Kirk, 2011). The view of Africa as problematic 
is enduring and public perception seems not to have changed since the ‘Live Aid’ 
initiatives. This view comes through clearly in the first repertoire with reference to the 
‘bowl you can’t fill’ over time', albeit accompanied by some reluctance and perhaps 
unspoken recognition of the prejudice underlying this view.  
   
These examples served to illustrate how the principles of deservingness are locally and 
geopolitically contextual, mediated discursively by ideology, and constructed through 
available cultural resources. These characteristics are exemplified in repertoire 3 
‘Something for nothing’ where humanitarian practice is reduced to money donation. It   
positions beneficiaries as getting something for nothing in contrast with the self, who has 
worked hard to earn that money and, thus, is the most deserving. This self-centred, 
transactional model (Darnton and Kirk, 2011) is in complete opposition to other-centred 
and universalist, humanitarian principles.  
  
It might seem surprising that the   speakers in repertoire 3 showed no attempt to tone 
down their statements, despite the context of a project on humanitarianism. However, 
their stance seems to be consistent with current UK beliefs about fairness and helping.  
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For example, the findings from a recent study on public attitudes to fairness (O’Brien, 
2011) show a strong attachment among the UK public to ideas focused on meritocracy 
and reciprocity, and a view that fairness equates with getting what you deserve:  
“[p]eople’s idea of fairness is strongly reciprocal – something for something” (O’Brien, 
2011:1). It would seem that people in the UK believe that help should be directed to those 
who are trying hard and doing the right thing, the principles underpinning the ‘seeing a 
difference’ repertoire. These ideas are reflected also in the last UK  
Conservative government’s neoliberal policies: for example, the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer promised that, through his reforms of the welfare state, “no-one will get 
something for nothing”9.More recently, the then Home Secretary, now Prime Minister, 
argued for application of a ‘compassion quota’ when dealing with refugees’ demands, 
adding that “there are people who need our help and there are people who are abusing 
our goodwill – and I know which side I’m on”10. Hence, although hospitality is considered 
a part of the national identity and a source of pride in Britain, it only applies to the ‘right’ 
kind of immigrants, to those defined as genuine, deserving refugees as distinct from the 
undeserving, bogus asylum seekers and economic migrants (Gibson, 2007). In the current 
political climate, the focus group participants’ stance might seem legitimate. It is 
illustrative of how ideologies are situated within and influenced by historically relevant 
contexts, with which people interact in complex and contradictory ways; it is illustrative 
of how commonsense notions of value, community and appropriate ways of behaving are 
socially and culturally embedded and, often, are conflicting and contradictory (Towns and 
Adams, 2009: 737).   
  
                                        
9 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24327890  
10 http://press.conservatives.com/post/130940020830/theresa-may-speech-a-beacon-of-hope  
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We have shown how decisions about monetary donation and humanitarian helping, 
overwhelmingly are conditional on the contingent characteristics and behaviour of those 
in need. There is no evidence of moral imperatives, which apply universally. Rather, 
reactions and moral actions are negotiated through pervasive socio-cultural practices and 
ideologies, and personally-meaningful everyday moralities. Of particular relevance are 
individualistic self-oriented rather than Other-oriented tendencies, the prioritization of 
individual gratification versus the greater good (particularly in the ‘something for nothing’ 
repertoire), the valuing of the work ethic and enterprise, and an overarching focus on 
materialist values and material responses.  
  
Chouliaraki (2013) laments the rising cultural narcissism and current utilitarian forms of 
humanitarianism. Others warn of the development, across Western societies, of narratives 
of growing selfishness and loss of morality and commitment (Scuzzarello et al., 2009). 
Our findings reflect these concerns: selfishness and self-centredness in repertoire 3, 
narcissism of cultural mirroring in repertoire 2 and the stubborn persistence of 
characterizations of the developing South as perennially demanding and eternal taking in 
repertoire 1.   
  
However, these geopolitical considerations rarely figure in social psychological 
investigations into prosocial behaviour and, undeniably, run counter to mainstream 
psychology’s attempts to remain neutral and focus on the individual. Indeed, mainstream 
social psychology has been criticized for portraying altruism as aspect of individual 
consciousness, which does not allow for a moral understanding of prosocial behaviour 
(Wyschogrod, 2002). Similarly, Sober (2002), critiquing the existing prosocial literature, 
questioned whether the popularity of a purely egoistic image of the human self is 
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determined by a culture of individualism and competition rather than being due to the 
compelling force of the findings.   
  
To disregard ideological and geopolitical factors in the study of prosocial behaviour in 
relation to humanitarian crises, can, at best, provide only a limited and fragmented picture 
of what is happening, and overlooks the broader patterns and dynamics influencing 
people’s responses to humanitarian crises. For example, although the Christian principle 
- of helping strangers with no expectation of a reward, personified by the biblical figure 
of the good Samaritan - has been found to be foundational and, enduringly, the most 
desired model for NGOs actions, this principle does not go uncontested, but intersects 
with and is resisted through other self-focused principles (Author et al., 2015). In this 
shifting, complex and ambivalent socio-cultural landscape it is impossible to identify 
simple formulas. Rather, humanitarian appeals and communications present the public 
with complex ideological dilemmas. Thus, although in agreement with much of the current 
research which highlights the role of intergroup dynamics, social categorization and just-
world theory, our findings demonstrate the ways that these factors are contextual, that 
they are ideologically negotiated and interact dynamically. Discursive analyses, treating 
the focus group participants’ statements as rehearsals of commonsense ideologies, allow 
us to see that moral responses and actions regarding humanitarian help are always locally 
and sociohistorically contextual. They highlight the need for prosocial behaviour research 
to engage more actively with the dilemmatic nature of moral decisions, particularly in 
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Appendix A: Transcriptions conventions:   
 (.)              Untimed pauses  
 (…)  Omitted material  
 []  explanatory material  
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 Q<>Q  reported speech/active voicing  
 Full stops, question marks and commas:   added to improve readability and  
reproduce, as much as possible, how the 
intonation of the speech was heard in 
transcription.  
